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* This is a product of a research project which Okazaki has worked on at the Research Institutes of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). 1. Introduction 
       This paper presents an empirical framework to analyze institutional change, and applies it to 
economic institutions in Japan, specifically the main bank system and long-term employment. 
Institutional analysis is one of the fields of economics and economic history that has undergone 
considerable development in recent years. Since the seminal works of Douglas North (North and 
Thomas[1973]; North[1990]), many economists and economic historians have come to agree with the 
idea that “institution matters.” (Aoki[1998, 2001]; Clague[1997]; Crafts[1997]; Greif[1997, 1998a, 
2003; Hoff and Stiglitz[2000]; Matthews[1986]; Mantzavinous[2001]; Milgrom, North and 
Weingast[1990]; Willamson[1999, 2000]]. 
     The essential part of the recent development of institutional analysis is the use of game theory to 
analyze institutions. Institutions are defined as regular patterns of activities which are the equilibria of 
a game played by members of a society.  It implies that institutions are self-enforcing. In other words, 
the concept of institutions as equilibria enables us to explain the existence of institutions endogenously 
(Aoki[2001]; Greif[1997, 2003]).       
     One of the most important remaining issues in institutional analysis is how to explain institutional 
change.  While stability is an essential attribute of institutions, and is well explained by the concept of 
institutions as equilibria, institutions have another essential attribute, namely that they can change over 
time.  The new books of the two leading scholars on institutional analysis mainly focus on theoretical 
discussions of institutional change (Aoki[2001]; Greif[2003]).  In this paper, I intend to make some 
contributions to the analysis of institutional change from an empirical perspective.   
There have been two approaches to institutional analysis; one based on classical game theory 
and the other on evolutionary game theory (Greif[1998a, 1998b]).  In addition, Aoki[2001] recently 
proposed a subjective game approach.  The basic idea of the empirical framework presented in this 
paper comes from evolutionary game theory, evolutionary biology and organizational ecology, but it is 
general enough to be applicable to all of the above three theoretical approaches. The empirical results 
of this paper will provide us with useful information to discriminate which mechanisms really worked 
or work in specific times and places.   
     The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses related literature and the framework.  
Section 3 explains the data.  Section 4 and 5 presents the results of empirical analysis.  Section 6 
concludes the paper.   
 
2. Literature and Framework 
      The seminal work of Alchian[1950]was the first to apply the ideas of evolutionary biology 
extensively to economics.  In this insightful paper, Alchian proposed a view that the economy is a 
system of selection which selects those agents whose mode of activities fit the environment.  
Specifically, those firms which fit well into the environment are more likely to earn positive profits, and therefore survive.  On the other hand, those firms which do not fit into the environment are more 
likely to make losses, and therefore be removed from the economy.  Consequently, the existing 
population of firms consists of those whose mode of activities is fitted to the environment.  As we can 
easily see, this is a direct application of Darwinian evolutionary biology.  Actually, Alchian[1950] 
compares heredity inheritance to imitation, mutation to innovation, and natural selection to selection 
by positive profits (p.220).   
      If we assume classical Darwinian theory applies, then by application of evolutionary biology we 
conclude that the existing mode of activities are uniquely determined by the exogenous environment.  
It is remarkable that while one of the main purposes of Darwin[1859] was to explain diversity of 
species, Darwin considered that diversity is basically determined by variety in the natural environment.     
However, since then, the landscape of evolutionary biology has changed substantially.  The most 
important change was the development of evolutionary game theory by John Maynard Smith 
(Smith[1982]).  Evolutionary game theory has essentially changed the meaning of the term 
environment in evolutionary biology.  The environment now includes not only the exogenous natural 
environment but also the demographic environment, which brings strategic relationships into 
biological evolution.  Hence, it is possible that evolution results in different equilibrium states, even if 
the natural environment is the same. 
     In the same year, a seminal work in the field of economics, Nelson and Winter[1982], was 
published.    While a major contribution of this book is formalizing an evolutionary model of economic 
growth and competition, it also contains rich insights on the evolution of an economic organization. 
This includes the concept of organizational routine, which is a persistent feature of the organization 
that determines its possible behavior (p.14).  Nelson and Winter[1982] focuses on the change in the 
population of organizations with these routines over time, rather than the change in a routine within 
each organization. The latter changes, mutations or innovations, however, are also thought to play an 
important role.  The change in the organizational population is thought to be basically determined by 
differences in the survival and growth rates between organizations with various routines.   
     From Nelson  and Winter[1982], two  large bodies of research, closely interrelated with each other, 
have developed, namely research on organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman[1989]; Carroll and 
Hannan[1995, 1999]; Hannan and Carroll[1992]), and the empirical research on the endogenous 
change of the market structure in the field of industrial organizations (Agrawal and Gort[1996]; 
Baldwin[1995]; Caves[1998]; Dunne and Hugh[1994]; Evans[1987]; Klepper[2002]; Sutton[1997]).          
     Organizational ecology aims at explaining the change in organizational diversity over time. It 
focuses on a couple of demographic variables with respect to organizations, namely the founding 
(birth) and death rates, and investigates the factors which influence on these rates, specifically, density 
and age.  The industrial organization literature, on the other hand, is interested in the change over time 
of market share distribution, market concentration, and its efficiency implications.  Gibrat’s Law is one of the issues (Sutton[1997]).  They focus on such firm-specific attributes as age and scale as 
exogenous variables.     
     Integrating the above literature, we can derive a framework for the empirical analysis of 
institutional change.  As institutions are defined as self-enforcing regularities of activities, the first 
step in conducting empirical research on institutional change is to measure how pervasive a certain 
mode of activity is in the society.  More specifically, we measure the ratio of firms with a certain 
relevant attribute to the total firm population.  The ratio is measured in terms of firm numbers as well 
as sales.   Next, we measure the same ratio after a certain interval to determine whether that attribute 
is proliferating or declining.  Where the ratio is measured in terms of sales, the difference between the 
initial year and final year can be decomposed into the following four factors, (i) the difference in the 
growth rates between those firms which existed in the initial year and those that survived over the 
interval, (ii) the difference in the exit (death) rates, (iii) the difference in the entry (birth) rates, and (iv) 
the rate of conversion to or from the attribute over the interval.  Where the ratio is measured in terms 
of the number of firms, the difference between the initial year and the final year can be decomposed 
into (ii), (iii) and (iv).  All of these four factors can be interpreted as measures of “fitness” in a 
Darwinian sense.  (i), (ii) and (iii) relate to selection, while (iv) relate to imitation.   
     We can further analyze the determinants of (i) and (ii) by extending a standard model of firm 
growth from the industrial organization literature to incorporate institutional variables).   
 
Gt=g[At-1, St-1, It-1]+ut                            (1)    
 
where Gt refers to sales growth of each firm over the period t-1 to t.  A, S and I refer to age, size, and 
the institutional attribute of each firm respectively. ut is an error term with a normal distribution and a 
mean of zero.  As some of the firms in period t-1 have exited by period t, growth rates for those firms 
cannot be observed.  Also, it is possible that the growth rate is correlated with the probability of exit.  
Therefore, in order to correct for sample selection bias, we assume the probability of firm survival is   
 
     Pr[D t=1]=Pr[et>-V[At-1, St-1, It-1]]                    (2) 
 
where Dt  is a dummy variable which equals 1, if the firm survives until period t, and zero, otherwise￿
et is an error term with a normal distribution and a mean of zero.  We can simultaneously estimate 
equation (1) and (2) by maximizing likelihood function (Amemiya[1984]; Green[2000]).  The 
coefficient of It-1 in equation (1) and (2) [determines][gives us information about] the fitness of i) and 
ii) of the institutional attribute, respectively.  This framework is also useful because by modifying 
equation (1) and (2), we can analyze the interaction of two or more institutions. 
   Gt=g[At-1, St-1, It-1 , I’t-1, It-1*I
’
t-1]+ut                 (3)    
       Pr[D t=1]=Pr[et>-V[At-1, St-1, It-1, It-1*I
’
t-1 ]           (4) 
where I
’
t-1  denotes the variable measuring another institution.  If the coefficient of the cross term of 
the two institutional variables in equation (3) or (4) is positive, the fitness of one enhances the fitness 
of the other.  In other words, these institutions are complementary in the selection process, and they 
will co-evolve.  On the other hand, if the coefficient is negative, these two institutions are substitutive.  
In this sense, we can empirically capture the institutional complementarity (Aoki[2001]) and its 
evolutionary implications in this framework.           
 
3.The data 
     The first step is to identify the firm population.  Here I use all of the industrial companies which 
were listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE I) at the end of 1960, 1970, 1980, 
1990 and 1999, respectively.  The listing data are obtained from various issues of the Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin of the TSE (Tosho Tokei Geppo).  Industrial companies include manufacturing, 
mining, agriculture and fishery companies.  We follow the industry classifications applied to firms by 
the TSE.  There were 433, 507, 593, 703, and 766 industrial companies listed on the TSE I at the end 
of 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1999 respectively. Out of the sample firms in 1960, 1970, 1980 and 
1990, I excluded 0, 3, 1 and 4 firms respectively, which ceased to be classed as industrial firms in the 
following 10 years.  These firms make up the sample firm population for this paper (Table 1).  As 
firms have changed their names from time to time, we cannot know which have entered and exited by 
simply comparing the firm populations between two years.  Information on entry, exit and name 
changes was obtained from the various issues of the Statistical Year Book of the TSE until 1983 and 
the Year Book of the TSE after that.  New entrants are considered to be new listings on to the TSE and 
conversions from the Second Section of the TSE (TSE II) to the TSE I.  Likewise, exiting firms are 
those firms exiting from the TSE or converting to the TSE II. 
The financial data on the sample firms are collected from the TSE[1961] for 1960, and from the Nikkei 
NEEDS database for the other years
1.  Concerning each year and firm, the data of the financial term 
which ended latest in that year are used.  The flow data (sales and profit) were converted into an 
annual figure.    
This paper employs two institutional variables; one variable focuses on the main bank 
relationship and the other focuses on long-term employment.  The main bank relationship refers to a 
long-term relationship between a bank and a firm in which the bank plays a central role in financing 
and in the corporate governance via its monitoring function (Aoki, Patrick and Sheard[1994]; Hoshi 
                                                        
1 While the database of the Development Bank of Japan includes the financial data from 1956, it sums 
the data of merged firms for the years before the merger, with respect to the period prior to 1983.  
Therefore, this database is not appropriate for the purposes of this paper. and Kashyap[2001]).  There are several ways to identify a main bank relationship.  Nakatani[1984] 
and Hoshi et al [1990, 1991] relied on the classification in Nenpo Keiretsu no Kenkyu , while 
Weinstein and Yafeh[1998] relied on the Industrial Grouping in Japan by Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants.  Kang[1993] and Kang and Shivdansani[1995] identified a main bank relationship if the 
largest lender was also the largest shareholder.  In this paper where we are focusing on the change 
over time of the main bank relationship itself it is important that the classification be objective and 
reproducible. However, the definition by Kang[1993] and Kang and Shivdansani[1995] is too narrow, 
as according to Kang and Shivdansani[1995] only 18% of the firms had a main bank relationship in 
1984(p.38).   
Therefore, I define a main bank relationship as existing if the largest lender of a firm does not 
change for three years.  For example, for 1960, if a firm’s largest lender was the same in 1958, 1959 
and 1960, this firm is identified as having a main bank relationship. This is one of the criteria by which 
Nenpo Keiretsu no Kenkyu identifies keiretsu group firms.  Borrowing data were obtained from the 
TSE[1959, 1960, 1961] for 1960, and the various issues of Nenpo Keiretsu no Kenkyu for the other 
years except 1998 and 1999.  The data on 1998 and 1999 were obtained from the Development Bank 
of Japan (DBJ) database.  Based on the measure employed, we cannot identify a main bank 
relationship for those firms which were listed on the TSE within the two years prior to 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990 and 1999.  In the rest of the paper, these companies are referred to as firms where data on 
the main bank relationship were not available
2.    
    The measure of long-term employment used was the average age of the male employees minus the 
average tenure of the male employees for each firm, which directly measures the average age of entry 
to each firm.   In the typical case of “life time employment,” a person is assumed to enter a certain firm 
just after they graduated from high school or university and will stay there until the age of mandatory 
retirement, meaning there is no recruitment in between those points.   Therefore, the lower the average 
age of entry is, the closer the employment system of that company is to the typical “lifetime 
employment”.  The data on the average age and tenure comes from the TSE[1961] for 1960, and 
various issues of the Diamond Kaisha Yoran for 1970, 1980 and 1990, and the DBJ database for 1999.        
 
4. Rise and fall of main bank system: Change of “fitness” 
     Table 1 summarizes the data on the pervasiveness of the main bank relationship in terms of the 
numbers of firms as well as sales.  In terms of firm numbers, we can say that roughly 70% of 
industrial firms for which borrowing data were available have had a main bank relationship since 1960 
in the sense defined above.  At the same time we find changes over time.  From 1960 to 1980, the 
                                                        
2 Besides these firms, there are several firms for which borrowing data were not available in the 
sources mentioned above, which, in turn, is because complete borrowing data were not available in 
their business reports.    percentage of the firms with a main bank relationship went up.  Then, from 1980 it declined until 
1990, and in the 1990s it rose slightly again.  Based on sales, the percentage of firms with a main bank 
relationship in 1960 was 76.3%.  While this rose to 78.5% in 1970, it has declined since then.  In this 
sense, the decline of the main bank system can be observed earlier in terms of sales than in terms of 
firm number.  Also, unlike the case of firm numbers, the sales percentage continued to decline in the 
1990s.  In conclusion, we can say that until 1970, the main bank relationships were in a rising phase, 
and since then they have been declining.  How has this change in the composition of the firm 
population occurred over time ?  This is the basic question of the evolutionary framework discussed 
in section 1. 
      To address this question each firm’s main bank relationship was followed over time.  The 
results are shown in Tables 2-5.  First, let us focus on the change from 1960 to 1970.  The population 
of 433 industrial firms in 1960, was composed of 286 firms with a main bank, 136 firms without a 
main bank, and 11 firms for which data were not available.  Out of the 286 firms with a main bank, 58 
firms (20.5%) had exited by 1970.  The 228 survivors are classified into the firms which were still 
with a main bank in 1970 (184), those which no longer had a main bank by 1970 (41), and those for 
which 1970 data were not available (3).  Focusing on the surviving firms, we find that 81.8 % of the 
firms with a main bank in 1960 also had one in 1970.  On the other hand, out of the 136 firms without 
a main bank in 1960, 33 firms (24.6%) had exited by 1970.  The exit rate was slightly higher than for 
those with a main bank.  Also, it is remarkable that out of the 103 survivors without a main bank in 
1960, 68 firms came to have a main bank relationship in 1970.  The ratio of the firms without a main 
bank that changed their attribute was much higher than that for firms with a main bank.  
Besides the 433 firms existing in 1960, there were 166 new entrants into the population by 1970.  
Out of them, 77 firms were with a main bank and 48 firms were without a main bank in 1970, while the 
other 44 firms did not have data available, mainly because they entered after 1968.  The ratio of the 
firms with a main bank for the newcomers is 61.6 %, excluding the 44 firms for which data were not 
available.  In other words, among the newcomers, the ratio of firms with a main bank was lower than 
in the population existing in 1960, which lowered the ratio of the firms with a main bank in the total 
firm population. The entry, exit and conversion of attributes in the 1960s described above, made the 
firm population in 1970
3.    
Similar analysis of the change from 1970 to 1980 is possible (Table 3).  The industrial firm 
population in 1970 was 504, which was composed of 331 firms with a main bank, 124 were without a 
main bank, and 49 firms for which the data were not available.  Out of the 331 firms with a main bank, 
18 firms (5.5%) had exited by 1980.  254 of the 313 surviving firms (81.2%) also had a main bank in 
1980.  On the other hand, out of the 124 firms without a main bank, 6 firms (4.9%) exited.  Unlike 
                                                        
3 As noted also in Table 3, the 3 firms which moved out of the industrial sector in the 1970s were 
excluded from the population in 1970. the 1960s, the exit rate was slightly lower for the firms without a main bank.  Out of the 118 survivors 
without a main bank in 1970, 79 firms (67.5%) came to have main bank in 1980, which implies that 
there is still a substantial amount of conversion from the non-main bank group to the main bank group 
occurring in the 1970s.  The ratio of firms with a main bank among the 114 newcomers was 62.2%, 
almost the same as in the 1960s. 
      As described above, movement in the firm population was basically similar between the 1960s 
and 1970s, except that the exit rate was generally much lower in the 1970s.  However, in the 1980s 
the movement in the characteristics shown above changed substantially (Table 4).   The industrial firm 
population in 1980 was 592, which was composed of 421 firms with a main bank, 144 firms without a 
main bank, and 27 firms for which data were not available.  Exit rates were generally very low in the 
1980s.  Out of the 411 survivors with a main bank in 1980, 321 firms (78.1%) also had a main bank in 
1990.  Out of the 142 survivors without a main bank in 1980, 70 firms (49.3%) came to have a main 
bank in 1990.  The ratio of those converting from the group non- main bank group to the main bank 
group was substantially lower than the ratio in the 1970s.  A similar change is observed in the 
composition of the newcomers.  The ratio of firms with a main bank for the newcomers, for which 
data were available, is 48.1%.  In other words, newcomers without a main bank outnumbered those 
with a main bank.   
      Finally, in 1990, the industrial firm population consisted of 699, which was composed of 440 
firms with a main bank, 218 firms without a main bank, and 41 firms for which data were not available.  
Exit rates went up again, especially for firms with a main bank.  As a result the exit rate of the firms 
with a main bank (5.0%) was much higher than that of the firms without a main bank (1.4%).  Out of 
the 418 surviving firms with a main bank, 363 firms (86.8%) also had a main bank in 1999.  This ratio 
was the highest among the periods observed here.  On the other hand, out of the 215 surviving firms 
without a main bank, 93 firms (43.3%) came to have a main bank in 1999.  This ratio was still lower 
than in the 1980s.  Also, among the 64 newcomers for which data were available, 34 firms (53.1%) 
were with a main bank.   
      Based on the results in Table 2-5, we can decompose the change in the percentage of firms with 
a main bank into the contributions of the difference in the exit (death) rates, the difference in the 
entrance (birth) rates, and the change in attribute over the intervals tested, which correspond to (ii), 
(iii) and (iv) in section 2.  To examine these contributions we express the number of firms with a main 
bank and the number of firms without a main bank at time 1 based on the variables at time 0 with the 



















 · cm                   (6) 
    M
i: Number of firms with a main bank at time i     N
i :Number of firms without a main bank at time i    
    X j
i:Number of firms with(m) or without(n) a main bank for which data were not available at time i 
    b j : Entry (birth) rate of firms with(m) or without(n) a main bank
4      
    d j : Exit (death) rate of firms with(m) or without(n) a main bank
5 
    c j: Ratio of the firms which converted from “with a main bank” to “without a main bank” (m) or 
from “without a main bank” to “with a main bank” (n)
6 
 
Using these formulae and assuming counterfactual bj , dj, and cj, we can calculate the counterfactual 
percentage of the firms with a main bank in time 1(M
1’, N
1’).  In order to make clear the contribution 
to the fitness of the factors (ii), (iii) and (iv), we assume the following conditions, respectively. 
   
    d m=dn=(dm
· M0+dn
· N0)/(M0+N0)                      (7)          
    b m=bn=(bm
· M0+bn
· N0)/(M0+N0)                      (8) 








1’) can be interpreted as the contribution of each of the 
fitness factors, (ii), (iii) and (iv).  The results are shown in Table 6.  The major reason why the share 
of firms with a main bank in terms of firm number increased in the 1960s and 1970s was the number of 
firms converting from the non-main bank to the main bank group.  In these periods, while most of the 
firms with a main bank in the initial year had a main bank also in the final year, many firms converted 
from “without a main bank” to “with a main bank.”  However, the large positive effect of these 
conversions was mitigated by the negative effect of new entrants.        
In the 1980s, however, while the negative effect of new entrants substantially increased, the effect 
of the conversions was reversed.  Namely, as the ratio of firms converting from “without a main 
bank” to “with a main bank” declined, conversions started to affect the percentage of the firms with a 
main bank negatively.  Finally, in the 1990s, the effect of conversions became positive again at the 
same time as the negative effects of new entrants decreased, which brought about the increase in the 
share of the firms with a main bank.  In conclusion, the major factors of the change in the main bank 
system were conversions and new entrants.  This implies, that based on the number of firms, the 
fitness factor which predominately affected the pervasiveness of main bank relationships has been 
imitation, not selection. 
     Similar analyses are also possible in terms of sales.  By measuring the percentage of firms with a 
                                                        
4 (Number of newcomers with a main bank)/M
0, and number of newcomers without a main bank/N
0 
5 (Number of exiting firms with a main bank)/M
0, and (number of exiting firms without a main 
bank)/N
0 
6 (Number of the firms which had a main bank in time 0 and lost it in time 1)/(M
0-dmM
0) and (Number 
of the firms which did not have a bank in time 0 and had one in time 1)/(M
1-dnN
0) main bank, we not only have a more relevant measure of the pervasiveness of the main bank system, 
we can also examine the effect of the fitness factor (i), namely the growth rate. The counterparts of 
Tables 2-5 are Tables 7-10.  Based on sales for the 1960s, the percentage of firms that had a main 
bank and exited was 10.6%, while those that exited without a main bank was 7.0%.  The lower ratios 
compared with the results for the firm numbers imply that the exiting firms were relatively small.  
Comparing firms with a main bank and those without a main bank, we find that the average scale of the 
exiting firms was larger in the former group.  Based on sales, the percentage of companies that 
survived between 1960 and 1970 and had a main bank in both years was 86.3%.  Conversely, based 
on sales, the percentage of surviving companies that did not have a main bank in 1960 but came to 
have a main bank in 1970 was 64.1%. This implies that conversions from “without a main bank” to 
“with a main bank” took place on a substantial scale, which is almost identical to the results for firm 
numbers.  Further, the share of newcomers in 1970 with a main bank based on sales was 62.0%.  The 
percentage of firms with a main bank was generally higher than the results for firm numbers, which 
means that the firms with a main bank were relatively large. 
     In the 1970s, the conversions from “with a main bank” to “without a main bank” increased 
remarkably, although in the 1980s, conversions from “without a main bank” to “with a main bank” 
declined.  Also, in terms of the sales of newcomers, the percentage of firms without a main bank 
became larger than the percentage with a main bank.  The [patterns observed][changes] in the 1980s 
were similar to those found based on firm numbers; however, the movement observed in the 1990s 
was different.  Based on firm numbers, the changes in the 1980s were similar to the changes in the 
1990s, however, the changes for the sales while in the same direction as the 1980s, were far more 
[significant][substantial] in the 1990s.  Conversions from “without a main bank” to “with a main 
bank” declined to as low as 22.1%, and the share of firms without a main bank amongst newcomers 
increased to 70.8%.  The difference between the results for the different measures implies that the 
firms without a main bank became larger.   
     In order to decompose the change in the percentage of firms with a main bank based on sales, we 























· gmn               (11) 
    M
i: Sales of firms with a main bank at time i 
    N
i :Sales of firms without a main bank at time i    
    X j
i:Sales of firms with(m) or without(n) a main bank for which data were not available at time i 
    b j : Entry (birth) rate of firms with(m) or without(n) a main bank in terms of sales
7    
                                                        
7 (Sales of newcomers with a main bank)/M
0, and sales of newcomers without a main bank/N
0.  Note 
that here and in the following notes M
i and N
i are in terms of sales.      d j : Exit (death) rate of firms with(m) or without(n) a main bank in terms of sales
8 
    c j: Ratio of firms which converted from “with a main bank” to “without a main bank” (m) or from 
“without a main bank” to “with a main bank” (n) in terms of sales
9 
  g mm: Growth rate of sales for firms which had a main bank at both time 0 and time1  
    g nm : Growth rate of sales for firms which did not have a main bank at time 0 and had a main bank 
at time 1 
    g nn: Growth rate of sales for firms which did not have a main bank at either time 0 or time 1  
    g mn: Growth rate of sales for firms which had a main bank at time 0 and did not have a main bank 
at time 1 
 
To make clear the contribution of the fitness factors (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), we assume the following 
conditions respectively.  
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1]                          (12)  
dm=dn=(dm
· M0+dn
· N0)/(M0+N0)                                            (13)  
    b m=bn=(bm
· M0+bn
· N0)/(M0+N0)                                            (14) 
    c m=cn=0                                                                   (15) 
 
The results are shown in Table 11.  The increase in the percentage of firms in the 1960s was basically 
due to conversions from “without a main bank” to “with a main bank.”  Also, new entries had a 
substantial negative effect on the percentage of the firms with a main bank.  These are similar to the 
results found for firm numbers.  In the 1970s however, unlike firm numbers, the percentage of firms 
with a main bank started to decline.  There are three major reasons.  First, new entries continued to 
have a negative effect.  Second, the effect of conversions was reversed.  Finally the effect of growth 
was also reversed.  The final point implies that the average growth rate for the firms with a main bank 
was lower than that for the firms without a main bank.  The effect of the growth rate expanded in the 
1980s and became the largest negative factor.  In the 1990s, these three negative effects continued, 
and as a result, the percentage of firms with a main bank continued to decline, unlike the results for 
firm numbers.  It is notable that when the percentage of firms with a main bank is measured in terms 
of sales, the fitness factors representing selection has a substantial effect as well as the fitness factors 
representing imitation.           
                                                        
8 (Sales of exiting firms with a main bank)/M
0, and (sales of exiting firms without a main bank)/N
0 
9 (Sales of firms which had a main bank at time 0 and lost it by time 1)/(M
0-dmM
0) and (Sales of the 
firms which did not have a bank at time 0 and had one by time 1)/(N0-dnN
0)   
5. Selection, complementarity and co-evolution 
     In this section I estimate equations (1),(2),(3) and (4) in section 1, using the data explained in 
section 2.  Table 12 reports the results on (1) and (2), with respect to the 1960s.  In both of the 
equations (a) and (b) in Table 12, a dummy variable indicating mergers as well as industry dummies 
were added.  The merger dummy equals 1, if the firm acquired other listed companies, and 0, 
otherwise.  MAIN is a dummy variable which equals 1, if the firm had a main bank relationship as 
defined in section 3.  Age is measured in years from when the firm was established.  Age and sales 
are logarithmic values.  The coefficients of age and sales are positive and statistically significant in 
the survival regression in equation (a).  Older and larger firms were more likely to survive in the 
1960s.  On the other hand, they were not significant in the growth regression.  Also, the coefficient 
of the main bank variable is not significant in either the survival or growth regressions.  Equation (b) 
includes an interaction term between the main bank variable and sales.  The coefficient of this term is 
significantly negative, while the coefficient of the main bank dummy is significantly positive.  This 
means that the main bank relationship had a positive effect on firm survival, but this effect diminished 
as the firm scale increased.  The turning point at which the effect of the main bank relationship on 
firm survival ceases was calculated to be 2,823 million yen. This is much smaller than the minimum 
size of the industrial firm population here.  Therefore, we can say that while the main bank 
relationship had a positive effect on the survival of smaller firms, its effect was negative for firms 
listed on the TSE I.   This result is consistent with the fact that the contribution of firm exits is negative 
in Table 12. 
     Table 13 reports the results for the 1970s.  We do not find significant coefficients in the survival 
regressions.  This may be because there are few firm exits observed over this period.  Also, the main 
bank variable is not significant in the growth regressions.  The results for the 1980s are basically the 
same, although the results are not reported.  These results show that the main bank relationship was 
neutral with respect to the impact of selection on institutional evolution in the 1970s and 1980s. Table 
14 reports the results for the 1990s.  In both the survival and growth regressions, the main bank 
variable is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, the main bank relationship had a negative 
effect on the selection process with respect to firm survival as well as firm growth.  Integrating the 
results of the previous section, we can say that main bank relationships lost their fitness in an 
evolutionary sense in the 1990s.  
     Finally I will examine the issue of institutional complementarity.  To accomplish this I add a 
variable that measures the average entrance age of male employees of each firm (ENTAGE) and 
include an interaction term between it and the main bank variable.  In the 1960s, the coefficient of 
ENTAGE is negative and statistically significant in the growth regression (Table 15). This implies that 
those firms which did not recruit employees in the middle of their careers, namely those firms which had a long-term employment system, tended to have a higher growth rate.  In this sense, long-term 
employment had evolutionary fitness over this period.  Also, the coefficient of the interaction term, 
MAIN*ENTAGE is negative.  While it is not significant at the 10% level, its p-value is 13.5%.  So, 
although the statistical significance is not high, we can say that there was institutional 
complementarity between the main bank relationship and long-term employment in the sense that they 
enhanced the fitness of each other.  In other words, the main bank relationship and long term 
employment co-evolved in the 1960s.   
     In the 1970s, the coefficient of ENTAGE is also significantly negative, which means that long 
term employment still had high fitness in this period (Table 16).  However, the coefficient of the 
interaction term becomes positive and declines in significance.  This implies that the co-evolutionary 
relationship of the main bank relationship and long term employment disappeared in this period.  In 
the 1980s and 1990s, the coefficient of ENTAGE and MAIN*ENTAGE are statistically insignificant 
(Table17, 18).  Therefore, the co-evolutionary relationship is no longer observed, and also the fitness 
of long-term employment itself declined over this period. 
 
Concluding remarks 
     In this paper I applied the ideas of evolutionary biology and evolutionary ecology to the empirical 
analysis of the evolution of institutions in postwar Japan.  The basic question is how selection and 
imitation have worked in the evolution of the economic institutions in Japan.  I focused on four 
factors of fitness, namely (i)growth rates, (ii)exit (death) rates, (iii)entry (birth) rates, and (iv)the rate 
of conversion of the attribute.  (i), (ii) and (iii) represent selection, while (iv) represents imitation in 
the evolutionary process.  Constructing a data set of industrial firms, I examined how the composition 
of the population has changed over time with respect to institutional attributes, specifically the 
presence of a main bank relationship, and to what extent the fitness factors (i)-(iv) contributed to that 
change.   
Several findings emerged.  First, where the pervasiveness of the main bank relationship was 
measured based on firm numbers, the main bank system expanded until the 1970s, after which it 
contracted, before it partially recovered in the 1990s.  The fitness factors which have mainly 
contributed to the change in the composition of population are (iv) the conversion rate and (iii) the 
entry rate.  While the entry rate has continued to have a substantial negative effect on the percentage 
of firms with a main bank relationship, the change in the sign of the conversion effect between the 
1970s and 1980s represents the turning point for the main bank system from a period of expansion to a 
period of contraction.  Second, where we measured the pervasiveness of the main bank relationship in 
terms of sales, the main bank system started to contract earlier, in the 1970s. Here the growth rate as 
well as the entry and conversion rates contributed to the changes in the population.  While the growth 
rate had a positive effect in the 1960s, after that its effect has been negative. This brought about the earlier decline of the main bank system and its continuing decline in the 1990s.   
Next I econometrically analyzed the effect of the exit and growth rates on the evolution of the 
main bank system, using a sample selection model.  It was found that the main bank relationship was 
basically neutral with respect to exit and growth until the 1980s, and that it had a negative effect on 
survival in the 1990s.  Finally, I examined the institutional complementarity between the main bank 
relationship and long-term employment and found that in the 1960s these two institutions worked 
cooperatively on firm growth.  In this sense, the main bank system and long-term employment were 
complementary and they co-evolved during this period.  After this period however, the co-evolution 
is not observed. 
The framework applied to the postwar Japanese institutions in this paper is highly versatile, and is 
applicable to the evolution of many other institutions and organizations in various times and places.  
For example, using this framework, we can analyze evolution of the governance structure of firms 
including the family and zaibatsu firms, the organizational structure of firms including the U-form and 
M-forms, the production system including factory and putting out, and so forth.  In this sense, I 
expect this framework will become a basic tool for the empirical analysis of institutional change. 
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 Table 1 Composition of firm population by financial relationship
1960 1970 1980 1990 1999
Number of firms With main bank 286 331 421 440 519
(67.8) (72.7) (74.5) (66.9) (70.3)
Without main bank  136 124 144 218 219
(32.2) (27.3) (25.5) (33.1) (29.7)
Data n.a. 11 49 27 41 28
Total 433 504 592 699 766
Sales(million yen) With main bank 5,040,244 22,976,507 68,308,962 100,926,640 105,609,540
(76.3) (78.5) (73.5) (67.1) (65.6)
Without main bank  1,562,786 6,292,616 24,643,028 49,542,098 55,271,652
(23.7) (21.5) (26.5) (32.9) (34.4)
Data n.a. 135,348 2,429,198 1,976,657 4,403,557 2,189,759
Total 6,738,378 31,698,321 94,928,647 154,872,294 163,070,951
Notes: See the text.
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I of Tokyo Stock Exchange, except a few firms which 









Firms existing in 1960 With main bank 184 41 3 228 58 286
Without main bank  68 33 2 103 33 136
Data n.a. 4 3 3 10 1 11
Total 256 77 8 341 92 433
New comers 77 48 41 166 0 166









Note: The population of aWith main bank 81.8 18.2 1.0 79.7 20.3 100.0
Without main bank  67.3 32.7 1.5 75.7 24.3 100.0
Data n.a. 57.1 42.9 27.3 90.9 9.1 100.0
Total 76.9 23.1 1.8 78.8 21.2 100.0
New comers 61.6 38.4 24.7 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total 72.7 27.3 8.2 84.6 15.4 100.0









Firms existing in 1970 With main bank 254 59 0 313 18 331
Without main bank  79 38 1 118 6 124
Data n.a. 34 13 0 47 2 49
Total 367 110 1 478 26 504
New comers 56 34 24 114 0 114









Note: The population oWith main bank 81.2 18.8 0.0 94.5 5.5 100.0
Without main bank  67.5 32.5 0.8 95.1 4.9 100.0
Data n.a. 72.3 27.7 0.0 96.2 3.8 100.0
Total 76.9 23.1 0.2 94.8 5.2 100.0
New comers 62.2 37.8 21.1 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total 74.6 25.4 4.0 95.6 4.4 100.0
Notes:The denominators of the italic figures are (Total-Exit-Data n.a.).
        Three firms which moved out of manufacturing industry are not included from 1970 to 1980.   









Firms existing in 1980 With main bank 321 90 0 411 10 421
Without main bank  70 72 0 142 2 144
Data n.a. 13 14 0 27 0 27
Total 404 176 0 580 12 592
New comers 39 42 41 122 0 122









Note: The population oWith main bank 78.1 21.9 0.0 97.6 2.4 100.0
Without main bank  49.3 50.7 0.0 98.6 1.4 100.0
Data n.a. 48.1 51.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total 69.7 30.3 0.0 98.0 2.0 100.0
New comers 48.1 51.9 33.6 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total 67.0 33.0 5.7 98.2 1.8 100.0
Notes:The denominators of the italic figures are (Total-Exit-Data n.a.).









Firms existing in 1990 With main bank 363 55 0 418 22 440
Without main bank  93 122 0 215 3 218
Data n.a. 29 12 0 41 0 41
Total 485 189 0 674 25 699
New comers 34 30 29 93 0 93









Note: The population oWith main bank 86.8 13.2 0.0 95.0 5.0 100.0
Without main bank  43.3 56.7 0.0 98.6 1.4 100.0
Data n.a. 70.7 29.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total 72.0 28.0 0.0 96.4 3.6 100.0
New comers 53.1 46.9 31.2 100.0 0.0 100.0
Total 70.3 29.7 3.7 96.7 3.3 100.0
Notes:The denominators of the italic figures are (Total-Exit-Data n.a.).
        Four firms which moved out of manufacturing industry are not included from 1990 to 1999.   
        Fourteen firm which moved into manufacturing industry from 1990 to 1999 is not includedTable 6 Decomposition of the change share of the firms with main bank: Number of firms 
%
1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1999
Total change 4.93 1.86 -7.49 3.46
Contribution Exit rate 0.37 -0.04 -0.10 -0.47
New entry -1.25 -1.56 -4.49 -0.81
Conversion 5.90 3.53 -3.03 5.15
Ratio to the total change Exit rate 7.5 -2.3 1.3 -13.6
New entry -25.4 -84.0 60.0 -23.4
Conversion 119.5 190.1 40.4 149.0
This data of the end year includes those firms which moved to non manugacturing industries in next
10 years.  Therefore the total change slightly different from that obtained from the previous table. 
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I of Tokyo Stock Exchange, except a few firms which Table 7 Change of the financial relationship of firms(1960-1970)
A.Sales (million yen)
1970
Sales in 1960 Sales in 1970
Survive Exit Total Survive
1960 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1960 With main bank 4,507,067 533,177 5,040,244 17,056,388 2,697,878 976,682 20,730,948
Without main bank  1,452,823 109,963 1,562,786 3,947,145 2,210,452 253,252 6,410,849
Data n.a. 135,348 6,059 141,408 72,812 165,768 404,950 643,530
Total 6,095,239 649,199 6,744,438 21,076,345 5,074,098 1,634,884 27,785,327
New comers 0 0 0 2,012,299 1,231,482 794,314 4,038,095
Total 6,095,239 649,199 6,744,438 23,088,644 6,305,580 2,429,198 31,823,422
B.Ratio(%)
1970
Sales in 1960 Sales in 1970
Note: The population of all of the firms listed Survive Exit Total Survive
1960 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1960 With main bank 89.4 10.6 100.0 86.3 13.7 4.7 100.0
Without main bank  93.0 7.0 100.0 64.1 35.9 4.0 100.0
Data n.a. 95.7 4.3 100.0 30.5 69.5 62.9 100.0
Total 90.4 9.6 100.0 80.6 19.4 5.9 100.0
New comers 62.0 38.0 19.7 100.0
Total 90.4 9.6 100.0 78.5 21.5 7.6 100.0
Notes:The denominators of the italic figures are (Total-Data n.a.).Table 8 Change of the financial relationship of firms(1970-1980)
A.Sales (million yen)
1980
Sales in 1970 Sales in 1980
Survive Exit Total Survive
1970 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1970 With main bank 22,546,473 430,034 22,976,507 48,842,953 13,390,829 0 62,233,782
Without main bank  6,098,235 194,381 6,292,616 12,586,450 6,088,693 680,590 19,355,733
Data n.a. 7,827,778 0 7,827,778 4,208,321 3,619,457 0 7,827,778
Total 36,472,486 624,415 37,096,901 65,637,724 23,098,979 680,590 89,417,293
New comers 0 0 0 2,959,835 1,544,049 687,812 5,191,696
Total 36,472,486 624,415 37,096,901 68,597,559 24,643,028 1,368,402 94,608,989
B.Ratio(%)
1980
Sales in 1970 Sales in 1980
Note: The population of all of the firms listed aSurvive Exit Total Survive
1970 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1970 With main bank 98.1 1.9 100.0 78.5 21.5 0.0 100.0
Without main bank  96.9 3.1 100.0 67.4 32.6 3.5 100.0
Data n.a. 100.0 0.0 100.0 53.8 46.2 0.0 100.0
Total 98.3 1.7 100.0 74.0 26.0 0.8 100.0
New comers 65.7 34.3 13.2 100.0
Total 98.3 1.7 100.0 73.6 26.4 1.4 100.0
Notes:The denominators of the italic figures are (Total-Data n.a.).Table 9 Change of the financial relationship of firms(1980-1990)
A.Sales (million yen)
1990
Sales in 1980 Sales in 1990
Survive Exit Total Survive
1980 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1980 With main bank 66,265,181 2,043,781 68,308,962 77,816,506 22,393,336 0 100,209,842
Without main bank  24,358,485 284,543 24,643,028 19,614,346 22,522,212 0 42,136,558
Data n.a. 1,976,657 0 1,976,657 1,147,433 1,872,277 0 3,019,710
Total 92,600,323 2,328,324 94,928,647 98,578,285 46,787,825 0 145,366,110
New comers 0 0 0 2,734,220 2,718,887 4,403,557 9,856,664
Total 92,600,323 2,328,324 94,928,647 101,312,505 49,506,712 4,403,557 155,222,773
B.Ratio(%)
1990
Sales in 1980 Sales in 1990
Note: The population of all of the firms listed atSurvive Exit Total Survive
1980 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1980 With main bank 97.0 3.0 100.0 77.7 22.3 0.0 100.0
Without main bank  98.8 1.2 100.0 46.5 53.5 0.0 100.0
Data n.a. 100.0 0.0 100.0 38.0 62.0 0.0 100.0
Total 97.5 2.5 100.0 67.8 32.2 0.0 100.0
New comers 50.1 49.9 44.7 100.0
Total 97.5 2.5 100.0 67.2 32.8 2.8 100.0
Notes:The denominators of the italic figures are (Total-Data n.a.).Table 10 Change of the financial relationship of firms(1990-1999)
A.Sales (million yen)
1999
Sales in 1990 Sales in 1999
Survive Exit Total Survive
1990 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1990 With main bank 97,729,651 3,196,989 100,926,640 88,446,366 9,469,712 0 97,916,078
Without main bank  49,064,070 478,028 49,542,098 11,493,055 40,549,556 52,042,611
Data n.a. 4,403,557 0 4,403,557 3,951,724 1,088,022 5,039,746
Total 151,197,277 3,675,017 154,872,294 103,891,146 51,107,289 0 154,998,435
New comers 0 0 0 1,718,394 4,164,363 2,189,759 8,072,516
Total 151,197,277 3,675,017 154,872,294 105,609,540 55,271,652 2,189,759 163,070,951
B.Ratio(%)
1999
Sales in 1990 Sales in 1999
Note: The population of all of the firms listed  Survive Exit Total Survive
1990 With main bank Without main 
bank
Data n.a. Total
Firms existing in 1990 With main bank 96.8 3.2 100.0 90.3 9.7 0.0 100.0
Without main bank  99.0 1.0 100.0 22.1 77.9 0.0 100.0
Data n.a. 100.0 0.0 100.0 78.4 21.6 0.0 100.0
Total 97.6 2.4 100.0 67.0 33.0 0.0 100.0
New comers 29.2 70.8 27.1 100.0
Total 97.6 2.4 100.0 65.6 34.4 1.3 100.0
Notes:The denominators of the italic figures are (Total-Data n.a.).Table 11 Decomposition of the change of the share of the firms with main bank: sales
%
1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1999
Total change 2.22 -4.93 -6.31 -1.43
Contribution Growth rate 0.27 -0.83 -2.86 -1.00
Exit rate -0.37 -0.07 -0.22 -0.39
New entry -1.95 -2.69 -1.55 -1.03
Conversion 4.18 -1.02 -1.87 1.1
Ratio to the total change Growth rate 12.2 16.8 45.3 70.1
Exit rate -16.8 1.5 3.5 27.1
New entry -88.0 54.6 24.6 72.0
Conversion 188.5 20.7 29.6 -79.3
The sales share of the firms with main bank. 
This data of the end year includes those firms which moved to non manugacturing industries in next 10 years.
Therefore the total change slightly different from that obtained from the previous table. 
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I of Tokyo Stock Exchange, except a few firms which Table 12 Main bank relationship , firm survival and growth 1960-1970
(1) (2)
Survival Growth Survival Growth
Age 0.3330 2.420 ** -0.0018 -0.299 0.3217 2.234 ** -0.0012 -0.219
Sales 0.6230 9.564 *** -0.0020 -0.254 0.9130 6.973 *** -0.0048 -0.575
Main -0.1606 -0.934 -0.0038 -0.674 3.0440 2.254 ** -0.0485 -0.947
Main*Sales -0.3831 -2.454 ** 0.0048 0.837
Constant -5.7458 -6.875 *** -7.9375 -6.773 ***
Merger 0.0359 2.530 **
Fishery 0.1534 1.627 0.1755 1.943 *
Mining 0.0731 0.774 0.0962 1.044
Foods 0.1320 1.447 0.1549 1.752 *
Textile 0.1406 1.517 0.1632 1.823 *
Paper and pulp 0.1436 1.559 0.1663 1.860 *
Chemical 0.1588 1.744 * 0.1813 2.055 **
Coal and petroleum products 0.1622 1.636 0.1873 1.909 *
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I of  0.1517 1.476 0.1751 1.752 *
Ceramics 0.1430 1.552 0.1648 1.848 *
Steel 0.1719 1.873 * 0.1946 2.181 **
Non-ferrous metals 0.1849 1.897 * 0.2071 2.154 **
Metal products 0.1404 1.472 0.1631 1.789 *
Machinery 0.1837 1.991 ** 0.2061 2.310 **
Electric machinery 0.1842 1.982 ** 0.2071 2.295 **
Transportation machinery 0.1946 2.081 ** 0.2167 2.386 **
Precision machinery 0.2045 2.190 ** 0.2272 2.508 **
Other manufacturing 0.1777 1.920 ** 0.1992 2.225 **
Sigma 14.537 *** 0.0415 13.154 ***
Log of Likelihood function 423.421 426.548Table 13 Main bank relationship , firm survival and growth 1970-1980
(a) (b)
Survival Growth Survival Growth
Age 0.8160 0.348 -0.0063 -1.140 0.0537 0.221 0.0537 0.22122
Sales 0.2350 1.633 0.0022 0.300 0.0312 0.112 0.0312 0.1117
Main -0.0956 -0.426 -0.0024 -0.473 -3.0172 -0.882 -3.0172 -0.88211
Main*Sales 0.2904 0.861 0.2904 0.8607
Constant -0.9961 -0.612 1.1534 0.370
Merger 0.5507 4.433 *** 0.0547 4.402 ***
Fishery 0.1245 1.199 0.1250 2.44286 **
Mining 0.0985 0.960 0.0991 1.917 *
Foods 0.1009 0.997 0.1015 2.110 **
Textile 0.0567 0.553 0.0569 1.171
Paper and pulp 0.0972 0.959 0.0978 1.971 **
Chemical 0.1090 1.070 0.1096 2.269 **
Coal and petroleum products 0.1906 1.818 * 0.1911 3.626 ***
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I 0.1107 1.020 0.1112 1.799 *
Ceramics 0.1042 1.015 0.1048 2.146 **
Steel 0.0894 0.875 0.0902 1.865 *
Non-ferrous metals 0.7523 0.742 0.0759 1.589
Metal products 0.0917 0.905 0.0922 1.976 **
Machinery 0.0764 0.752 0.0769 1.629 *
Electric machinery 0.0974 0.961 0.0980 2.048 **
Transportation machinery 0.0969 0.940 0.0974 1.984 **
Precision machinery 0.1159 1.145 0.1165 2.429 **
Other manufacturing 0.1157 1.129 0.1161 2.400 **
Sigma 0.0323 20.133 *** 0.0322 20.067 ***
Log of Likelihood function 786.397 787.157Table 14 Main bank relationship , firm survival and growth 1990-1999
Survival Growth
Age -0.1278 -0.311 -0.0038 -1.211
Sales 0.0699 0.790 0.0040 2.665 ***
Main -0.5670 -2.281 ** -0.5670 -2.281 **
Constant 1.9155 0.898
Merger 0.0367 3.477 ***




Paper and pulp -0.0126 -0.458
Chemical -0.0352 -1.258
Coal and petroleum products -0.0344 -0.528
Rubber -0.2517 -0.873
Ceramics -0.0563 -2.025 **
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I  -0.0419 -1.510
Non-ferrous metals -0.0123 -0.483
Metal products -0.0276 -1.019
Machinery -0.0130 -0.483
Electric machinery -0.0243 -0.861
Transportation machinery -0.0028 -0.275
Precision machinery -0.0165 -0.610
Other manufacturing -0.0127 -0.421
Sigma 0.0333 20.730 ***
Log of Likelihood function 1160.810Table 15 Complementarity between main bank relationship and long-term employment, 1960-1970
(a) (b)
Survival Growth Survival Growth
Age 0.3292 2.345 ** -0.0030 -0.523 0.3217 2.193 ** -0.0026 -0.473
Sales 0.6415 9.487 *** -0.0032 -0.446 0.8887 6.733 *** -0.0060 -0.781
Main -0.1501 -0.858 0.0706 1.423 2.8515 2.074 ** 0.0149 0.197
Main*Sales -0.3547 -2.259 ** 0.0054 0.911
Constant -5.7280 -6.735 *** -7.7427 -6.5236 ***
Merger 0.0360 2.503 ** 0.0357 2.591 **
Entage -0.0023 -1.732 * -0.0024 -1.828 *
Entage*Main -0.0032 -1.496 -0.0029 -1.388
Fishery 0.2285 2.500 ** 0.2595 2.724
Mining 0.1453 1.591 0.1773 1.833
Foods 0.2030 2.316 ** 0.2352 2.535
Textile 0.2036 2.268 ** 0.2357 2.491
Paper and pulp 0.2115 2.366 ** 0.2434 2.577
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I of Tok 0.2287 2.596 *** 0.2603 2.787
Coal and petroleum products 0.2351 2.481 ** 0.2662 2.678
Rubber 0.2164 1.977 ** 0.2499 2.217
Ceramics 0.2155 2.412 ** 0.2465 2.612
Steel 0.2458 2.756 *** 0.2751 2.922
Non-ferrous metals 0.2574 2.738 *** 0.2891 2.888
Metal products 0.2102 2.279 ** 0.2420 2.528
Machinery 0.2505 2.790 *** 0.2822 2.988
Electric machinery 0.2434 2.694 *** 0.2759 2.893
Transportation machinery 0.2664 2.933 *** 0.2976 3.111
Precision machinery 0.2609 2.873 *** 0.2931 3.065
Other manufacturing 0.2387 2.633 *** 0.2707 2.852
Sigma 0.0410 14.039 *** 0.0409 13.214
Log of Likelihood function 409.187 412.100Table 16 Complementarity between main bank relationship and long-term employment, 1970-1980
Survival Growth
Age 0.0834 0.355 -0.0080 -1.489
Sales 0.2369 1.645 * 0.0014 0.200
Main -0.9543 -0.425 0.0508 -1.190
Main*Sales
Constant -1.0222 -0.627
Merger 0.0562 4.550 ***
Entage -0.0035 -2.225 **
Entage*Main 0.0021 1.161
Fishery 0.2187 2.005 **
Mining 0.1909 1.780 *
Foods 0.1928 1.804 *
Textile 0.1463 1.356
Paper and pulp 0.1882 1.759 *
Chemical 0.2006 1.867 *
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at the Section I of Toky 0.2837 2.574 ***
Rubber 0.2032 1.777 *
Ceramics 0.1975 1.821 *
Steel 0.1827 1.695 *
Non-ferrous metals 0.1683 1.564
Metal products 0.1871 1.732 *
Machinery 0.1687 1.571
Electric machinery 0.1898 1.773 *
Transportation machinery 0.1896 1.745 *
Precision machinery 0.2072 1.942 *
Other manufacturing 0.2105 1.919 *
Sigma 0.0316 19.454 ***
Log of Likelihood function 787.680Table 17 Complementarity between main bank relationship and long-term employment, 1980-1990
Survival Growth
Age 0.5589 0.124 -0.0082 -0.561
Sales 0.0360 0.394 -0.0013 -0.149









Paper and pulp 0.0501 0.216
Chemical 0.0552 0.238
Coal and petroleum products 0.0050 0.022
Note: The population of all of the firms listed at 0.0637 0.267
Ceramics 0.0585 0.251
Steel 0.0320 0.138
Non-ferrous metals 0.0523 0.224
Metal products 0.0726 0.311
Machinery 0.0704 0.303
Electric machinery 0.0929 0.400
Transportation machinery 0.0749 0.321
Precision machinery 0.0909 0.389
Other manufacturing 0.0794 0.341
Sigma 0.0349 0.155
Log of Likelihood function 1024.590Table 18 Complementarity between main bank relationship and long-term employment, 1990-1999
Survival Growth
Age -1.1154 -0.283 -0.0068 -1.186
Sales 0.0714 0.808 0.0040 2.538
Main -0.5608 -2.253 **
Constant 1.8473 0.867







Paper and pulp -0.0122 -0.362
Chemical -0.0348 -1.023




Non-ferrous metals -0.0120 -0.369
Metal products -0.0272 -0.814
Machinery -0.0126 -0.378
Electric machinery -0.0238 -0.692
Transportation machinery -0.0075 -0.216
Precision machinery -0.0160 -0.478
Other manufacturing -0.0121 -0.336
Sigma 0.0334 19.996
Log of Likelihood function 116.830